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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review all 
final judgments entered in domestic cases by the District 
Court for the State of Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-
2a-3(2)(h), and Rule 3(e), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
In summary, this appeal challenges the Trial Court Order 
dismissing the Petitioner's action for divorce. More 
specifically Appellant presents the following issues for 
review. 
1. The Trial Court misapplied Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5 
(1987) both procedurally and substantively as a statute 
limiting subject matter jurisdiction. Interpretation of 
statutory language is reviewed for correctness without 
deference to the lower court's ruling. Gramlich v. Munsey, 
839 P.2d 1131,1332 (Utah, 1992) 
A. The improper application of U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 (1987) 
permitted Mr. Snarr to file last minute dispositive motions 
without complying to the appropriate Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
B. If timely, Mr. Snarr's motion is nevertheless waived 
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by the four corners of the parties' pleadings. 
2. In arguendo, if U.C.A. §30-1-4.5 (1987) is 
applicable to the case at bar, the statute is an 
unconstitutional restriction of Ms. Snarr's access to a 
court for a remedy pursuant to Utah State Constitution, Art. 
I. Section 11. The constitutionality of a statute is 
reviewed for correctness, if the issue is properly reserved 
on the record and briefed at the lower court. Aroax 
Magnesium Corp. V. Utah Stat.fi Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256 
(Utah 1990). These issues were presented to the Trial Court 
immediately upon the filing of Mr. Snarr's last minute 
motion. (R.130,160,209, 227; Tr.7-8,20) 
3. The Appellant is entitled to attorney's fees and the 
matter should be remanded with instructions on that issue. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules are believed to be determinative and bear directly on 
the issues related to this appeal. 
RULES: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(c); 
TTt-ah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(h); 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 9(i); 
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(h); 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501(3)(g); 
STATUTES: 
Utah Corte Annotated §30-1-4.5 (1987) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS: 
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 11; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order entered by the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on 
March 2, 1999, dismissing the Petitioner's action for 
divorce. 
The parties were originally married in 1969.(R.23) They 
had two children and divorced the first time in 1980.(R.23) 
Within a short time period thereafter, they returned living 
together and raising their two minor children (R.2,23,33) 
In July, 1996, the Snarr's separated for the second 
time. The relationship ended on approximately July 7, 1996. 
(R.33) Throughout 1980 to 1996, the parties held themselves 
out as husband and wife.(R.1,6) Ms. Snarr had not been 
employed (R. 36) in the private sector between 1992 and the 
time of separation.(R.24) As a result of the death of the 
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parties oldest son in 1992, Ms. Snarr became depressed. 
(R.25) She received psychotherapy from 1992 through 1997 
(R.25) and had other significant physical health problems. 
(R.25,72-3,) 
After separation and in approximately September, 1997, 
Ms. Snarr obtained a retail sales position at Fred 
Meyer's.(R.72) That employment continued until injuring her 
back from the pre-existing problems and surgery in 1996 
(R.72-3,94-100). After Pre-trial Conferences before the 
Commissioner and the assigned Judge, the matter was 
scheduled for trial.(R.93) On the day of trial, August 12, 
1998, Mr. Snarr filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the 
Common Law Marriage Statute, Utah Code Ann. 30-1-4.5 
(1987).(R.124) The Trial Court granted the motion after 
further briefing and argument on March 2, 1999. 
Ms. Snarr claims she is entitled to a divorce and Mr. 
Snarr's waived the affirmative defenses presented for the 
first time on the day of trial. 
Course of the Proceedings 
The parties lived together from 1969 to July 7, 1996. 
(R.23,33). In 1980, they separated and divorced. However, 
the began living together shortly thereafter.(Mr. Snarrfs 
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Affidavit,R.33) Mr. Snarr admits these allegations 
contained in paragraph 2 of the Ms. Snarr's Petition 
(Complaint). (See Respondent's Answer to Complaint, 
12.(R.6) Throughout this time period (1980-96) the parties 
held themselves out as husband and wife. (Respondent's 
Answer, 12,R.6; Mr. Snarr's Affidavit,1iv,R.35) 
After the parties separated on July 7, 1996, Ms. Snarr 
filed her action for divorce on October 7, 1996.(R.l) After 
the parties explored the possibility of settlement, (Tr.2) 
the Respondent (Mr. Snarr) filed his Answer to Complaint on 
February 14, 1997. He also contemporaneously filed a 
^Request for Trial Setting'.(R.9) Discovery was pursued from 
April through August, 1997.(R.12,14,16,19) According to Mr. 
Snarr's theory of the case. The entire litigation must be 
completed within one (1) year from the ^termination of the 
relationship'. According to Mr. Snarr's theory, that one 
year expired on July 7, 1997. 
Although Mr. Snarr claims the trial court lost 
jurisdiction after July, 1997, he thereafter pursued the 
following proceedings. Mr. Snarr stipulated to temporary 
alimony and to maintain Ms. Snarr's health insurance in 
September, 1997.(R.31) In addition to the ^Request for 
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Trial Setting' filed in February, 1997, Mr. Snarr filed 
^Certificate of Readiness for Trial' in late September, 
1997.(R.59) A Pre-Trial Conference was rescheduled by 
agreement from October, 1997 (R.64) and held before 
Commissioner Evans on November 3, 1997.(R.69) The matter 
was certified by the Court Commissioner to the assigned 
Judge, Honorable Anne M. Stirba, presiding.(R.69) 
The parties further stipulated to more informal 
discovery in November, 1997.(R.86-91) The Pre-Trial 
Conference before the assigned trial judge was held in 
March, 1998.(R.92) At that time, the first trial date was 
set for May 27, 1998.(R.93) Mr. Snarr never raised any issue 
regarding subject matter jurisdiction in either Pre-Trial 
Conference before the Commissioner or the assigned trial 
Judge. 
Due to changes in Ms. Snarr's health and employment, she 
filed a motion to amend the prior Order for temporary 
alimony on March 9, 1998.(R.94-5) A hearing was scheduled 
on her motion for April 27, 1998,(R.102) but not heard due 
to the proximity of the May trial date. Mr. Snarr filed a 
responsive Affidavit. As described in greater detail below, 
Mr. Snarr did not seek a dismissal of the divorce action in 
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this responsive pleading filed on April 24, 1997, nine (9) 
months after the alleged statute of limitations issue became 
ripe. Instead, Mr. Snarr argued the *Jones' factors 
regarding alimony. Mr. Snarr's affidavit also seeks to 
defer a ruling until the May trial date. (R.110,113) 
Due to a calendar conflict by the Trial Court, the lower 
court continued the May 27th date, six days prior to trial. 
(R.122-3) The trial was rescheduled for August 12, 1998. 
On August 10, 1998, two days prior to trial, counsel for 
Mr. Snarr mailed his Motion to Dismiss to opposing counsel. 
The Motion to Dismiss is actually filed on the day of 
trial.(R.124) 
Mr. Snarr's Motion to Dismiss was made pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and based 
upon Utah's Common Law Marriage statute, Utah Code Annotated 
§30-1-4.5 (1987).(R.124) 
Trial Court Disposition 
On August 12, 1998, the Trial Court received oral 
arguments and the matter was continued for further briefing 
and argument. The matter was referred back to the Court 
Commissioner and Recommendations were entered by the 
Honorable Michael S. Evans, Court Commissioner, on December 
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2, 1998. Ms. Snarr filed timely Objections to 
Commissioner's Recommendations on December 14, 1998.(R.214) 
and further hearing was held before the assigned Trial Judge 
on February 11, 1999.(R.245) The Honorable Anne M. Stirba 
affirmed the Court Commissioner's Recommendations and 
entered an Order on March 2, 1999, dismissing Ms. Snarr's 
divorce action pursuant to Utah Corig Annotated §30-1-
4.5(1987).(R.228-9) 
Ms. Snarr filed her Notice of Appeal on March 30, 1999. 
(R.231) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of the case are undisputed between the 
parties. Mr. and Ms. Snarr were originally married in 
1969.(R.23) They had two children from this marriage and 
both born prior to 1980.(R.23) In 1980, the parties 
separated and divorced. However within a short period 
thereafter, they again resided together with the 
children.(R.2,23,33) The parties continued to reside 
together and hold themselves out as husband and wife until 
July 7, 1996.(R.1,6) 
Upon the parties physical separation, Mr. Snarr left the 
marital residence.(R.34) On October 7, 1996, Ms. Snarr 
8 
filed her Divorce Complaint and alleged in pertinent part 
that, 
"12. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband having 
been first married in 1969 later divorced in 1980, however, 
they continued to reside together and held themselves out as 
husband and wife from February, 1980 to the date the (sic) 
separated on approximately July 7, 1996. 
13. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable 
differences have arisen between the parties making the 
continuation of the marital relationship impossible. 
111. The parties acquired various debts and obligations 
incurred during the marriage. It is reasonable that said 
debts and obligations be divided between the parties in a 
fair and equitable manner. 
113. Each party should be ordered to do whatever is 
necessary to implement the terms of the Decree of Divorce to 
be entered herein, including but not limited to transferring 
all necessary items of property, titles, deeds, documents or 
any other item necessary to comply with the terms of the 
Decree of Divorce.(R.1-3) 
The above allegations of Petitioner's Complaint were 
unequivocally admitted by Mr. Snarr in is Answer.(R.5-7) In 
addition, Mr. Snarr's prayer for relief contained the 
following request, "WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that a 
Decree of Divorce be entered in accordance with terms of his 
Answer."(R.7) (Emphasis in the Original) 
Between October 7, 1996 and February, 1997 the parties 
explored the possibilities of settlement. That effort was 
exhausted and Mr. Snarr filed an Answer on February 14, 
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1997.(R.5) Contemporaneously, a Request for Trial Setting 
was filed on February 14, 1997.(R.9) 
The only affirmative defense asserted by Mr. Snarr in 
his original and only responsive pleading to the Complaint 
is a general averment of *failure to state a claim upon 
which may be granted' without reference to either a statute 
or a rule of procedure.(R.5-7) 
Mr. Snarr asserted that Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5(1987) 
is a procedural statute that limits subject matter 
jurisdiction 1 year after the parties terminated their 
relationship. To that end, Mr. Snarr filed a Motion to 
Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), U.R-Civ.P,r on the day of 
trial. Mr. Snarr's motion was filed 25 months after the 
parties separated and 13 months after the supposed door 
closed on subject matter jurisdiction. 
During that intervening 13 months, Mr. Snarr stipulated 
to temporary alimony and continuation of his ex-wife's 
health insurance. Mr. Snarr also participated in two Pre-
trial conferences without raising any claimed deficiency in 
Petitioner's complaint. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Snarr's motion does not 
comport to either Rule 6, nt.ah Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
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4-501, Corifi of Judicial Administration. Under the guise 
that the issue is subject matter in nature, the Trial Court 
entertained the motion and ultimately ruled against Ms. 
Snarr, dismissing her divorce action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Respondent/Appellee inappropriately and untimely 
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the day of trial. Mr. Snarr 
asserts the Trial Court lost subject matter jurisdiction 
unless all proceedings are complete within one year from the 
date of the parties' separation. 
The Trial Court erred by hearing the untimely motion on 
the day of trial. Mr. Snarr neither pled a specific statute 
as an affirmative defense as required by Rule 9, n.R.Civ.P. 
nor did he file his dispositive motion in accordance with 
Rule 4-501, C.J.A.f during the preceding 13 months. 
The statute in question is simply an inarticulate 
statute of limitations. It is unique in that it requires 
all proceedings to be completed within 1 year from the date 
of separation. Unlike most statute of limitations which 
dictate a time period to initiate an action, Utah Code 
Annotated §30-1-4.5 (1987), requires termination of all 
proceedings within a finite period (one year). 
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Assuming arguendo that Utah Code Annotated §30-1-4.5 
(1989) is not a statute of limitations, it is an 
unconstitutional restriction upon Ms. Snarr's access to 
courts pursuant to Art. I, Section 11, Utah State 
Constitution. 
These issues were preserved before the trial court and 
fully briefed below.(R.130,160,209, 227; Tr.7-8,20) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT INAPPROPRIATELY APPLIED D.C.A. §30-1-4.5 
SUBPOINT A 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT TIMELY. 
This matter was originally scheduled for trial on May 
27, 1998. Prior to that date, Mr. Snarr did not file any 
dispositive motions. Approximately 77 days elapsed between 
the original trial date and the second trial date (August 
12, 1998). It is undisputed that Mr. Snarr filed this 
Motion to Dismiss on the day of trial. 
At trial, Ms. Snarr did not waive the issue of 
timeliness.(Tr.2) Instead, she preferred to argue the 
motion as opposed to continuing the matter for a third trial 
date. 
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Rule 6(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states, 
For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other 
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the 
hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days 
before the time specified for the hearing, unless a 
different period is fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, 
or by order of the court. 
It is undisputed that Mr. Snarr did not meet any of the 
exceptions of Rule 6(d), and therefore the Motion to Dismiss 
was not timely. 
The timeliness of dispositive motions is further 
addressed in Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-
501(3)(g). 
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least 
thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No 
dispositive motions shall be heard after that date 
without leave of the Court. 
The obvious reason for these time constraints is to 
avoid the exact procedure employed by Mr. Snarr herein. 
Namely, an eleventh hour allegation that could obviate the 
need for a trial. The entire purpose of Rule 6 and Rule 4-
501 are circumvented by the Mr. Snarr's last minute maneuver 
in the case at bar. (Tn r<? Mr.Cnner 717 P.2d 701 (Utah, 1986). 
SUBPOINT B 
MR. SNARR WAIVED HIS MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Although Mr. Snarr captioned his Motion to Dismiss as a 
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subject matter jurisdiction issue, it simply employs U.C.A. 
§30-1-4.5(1987). Mr. Snarr's motion is more aptly 
interpreted as a statute of limitations. However, that 
interpretation is qualified because of the unusual language 
contained in §30-1-4.5. Counsel is unaware and can not 
locate any statute with similar restrictions requiring a 
finite date to complete litigation. 
Mr. Snarr's attempt to characterize his motion by 
captioning the same as a subject matter jurisdiction is an 
adept effort to frame the issue in a favorable manner for 
Mr. Snarr. However, Mr. Snarr's mischaracterization does 
not divorce the trial court of jurisdiction. The Utah 
Supreme Court reviewed this very issue in an Industrial 
Commission case. In American Coal Co. V. Sandstromf 689 
P.2d 1 (Utah, 1984), the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
precluded raising a statute of limitations for the first 
time on appeal. In analyzing the maneuver, the Court stated 
that statute of limitations are not jurisdictional and 
therefore can be waived. Id at 4. The Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Sandstromr has been followed by this Court in 
James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567, 571 (Utah Ct. Appeal, 1998). 
This analysis is consistent with Rule 8(c) U.R-Civ.P. 
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Rule 8(c) states in mandatory language, x...a party shall 
set forth affirmatively... statute of limitations ...' 
(Emphasis Added) Although Mr. Snarr may desire to caption 
his motion as ^subject matter', the label does not alter the 
contents of the statute of limitations. The affirmative 
defense was waived. 
POINT II 
MR. SNARR WAIVED ANY SUBSTANTIVE DEFENSE CREATED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-1-4.5 (1987). 
SUBPOTNT A 
MR. SNARR'S PLEADINGS ADMITTED A MARITAL RELATIONSHIP. 
Mr. Snarr filed his Answer on approximately February 14, 
1997, seven (7) months after the parties final separation. 
(Appellee/Respondent's Answer, Seef Addendum p.31). In 
pertinent part, Mr. Snarr unequivocally admitted the 
following allegations from Petitioner's Complaint filed 
October 7, 1996. 
"12. Plaintiff and defendant arfi wife and husband 
having been first married in 1969 later divorced in 
1980, however, they continued to reside together and 
held themselves out as husband and wife from February, 
1980 to the date of the (sic) separated on approximately 
July 7, 1996. (Emphasis Added) 
f3.During the nourse of the marriage irreconcilable 
differences have arisen between the parties making 
continuation of the marital relationship.(Emphasis 
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Added) 
19. The parties have acquired a home and real 
property during the course of the marriage... 
110. The parties have acquired an interest in 
various items of personal property including, but not 
limited to, an interest in'Auto Trend (sic) furniture, 
furniture, (sic) furnishing, appliances, bank and 
retirement accounts, automobiles and travel trailer, 
stocksf securities and other assets. It is reasonable 
that said personal property be divided between the 
parties in a fair and equitable manner.(Emphasis Added) 
113. Each party should be ordered to do whatever is 
necessary to implement the terms of the Decree of 
Divorce to be entered herein, including but not limited 
to transferring all necessary items of property, titles, 
deeds, documents or any other item necessary to comply 
with the terms of the Decree of Divorce. (Emphasis 
Added) 
In addition to these blanket admissions, the Defendant 
made a specific prayer for relief, "WHEREFORE, the Defendant 
prays that a Decree of Divorce be entered in accordance with 
terms of his Answer." (Emphasis in the Original) 
(Respondent's Answer, p.3) 
It was reasonable for Ms. Snarr to rely upon the 
unamended and unequivocal admissions in Respondent's Answer. 
It is now disingenuous for the Mr. Snarr to claim he wanted 
anything other than a divorce. But for a creative eleventh 
hour claim under nt.ah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, a divorce trial 
would have been conducted on August 12, 1998. 
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The importance of the above emphasized references to Ms. 
Snarr's Complaint shows the specific intent of the Mr. Snarr 
until the day of trial. He admitted various items of 
personal property were acquired during the marriage. The 
emphasized items were all acquired after 1980. This is an 
explicit admission that a marital relationship existed after 
1980. He further admits joint interest in the property 
acquired after 1980. Until August 12th, everyone was 
preparing for a divorce trial. 
Mr. Snarr's theory concludes that one (1) year after 
separation, (July, 1997) his remedy changed. However, the 
record contains more evidence demonstrating both parties 
reliance upon the pleadings. After his remedy supposedly 
changed, Mr. Snarr engaged in the following proceedings. On 
September 25, 1997, the Respondent stipulated to temporary 
alimony. He attended two (2) pretrial conferences (November, 
1997 and March, 1998). He prepared for trial in May, 1998 
until a last minute calendar change on the court's own 
motion. He then permitted 75 days elapse between trial 
dates before submitting the motions in question. It was 
thirteen (13) months after the triggering date cited by 
Respondent, before he acted. 
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By the Respondent's own acquiescence, he waived the 
claimed defenses. 
SUBPOINT B 
Pursuant to U.R.Civ,P.f Mr. Snarr Waived All Defenses. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, is a specific statutory 
defense with which specificity must be pled. Rule 9(h), 
U-R-Civ-P- states: 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the 
statute of limitations it is not necessary to state the 
facts showing the defense but it may be alleged 
generally that the cause of action is barred by the 
provisions of the statute relied on, referring to or 
describing such statute specifically and definitely by 
section number/ subsection designation, if any/ or 
otherwise designating the provision relied upon 
sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation 
is controverted/ the party pleading the statute must 
establish, on the trial, the facts showing that the 
cause of action is so barred. (Emphasis Added) 
It is uncontroverted that Mr. Snarr made no affirmative 
defenses and did not plead any specificity regarding the 
statute upon which he now relies. In Wasatch Mings Co. V. 
Hopkinsonf 465 P. 1007, (Utah, 1970) the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the necessity to specify a statutory defense in an 
answer. Specifically in that case, the defendant made a 
general plea of statute of limitations as an affirmative 
defense. However, the defendant was not specific in regard 
to what statutory bar may be present. The Utah Supreme 
18 
Court therefore held the defendant waived the issue. 
Parenthetically, the Utah Supreme Court noted that if a 
specific statute had been referred to by defendant, 
plaintiff's claims would have been barred. Id. at fnote 6. 
SUBPOINT C 
Rule 8(c)fii.R.Civ.P.r Mandates Affirmative Defenses Be Pled. 
Rule 8(c), U.R.Civ.P. is applicable to the case at bar. 
This rule states: 
(c)Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding 
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord 
and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of 
risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, 
duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, 
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, 
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, 
Statute Qf limitations, waiver, and any other matter 
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. when a 
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a 
counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court 
on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the 
pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(Emphasis Added) 
This policy if also repeated in Rule 12(h), U.R.Civ.P.r 
and failure to plead an affirmative defense is a waiver of 
that claim. In Wasftacha v. Terra, 528 P.2d 902, (Utah, 
1974) the attempt to add an accord and satisfaction as a 
defense, one (1) week before trial was denied by the trial 
court and affirmed on appeal. 
As stated earlier, in American Coal Co. V. Sandstromf 
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689 P. 2d 1 (Utah, 1984) the Utah Supreme Court specifically 
stated that a statute of limitation defense is not a 
jurisdictional defense and therefore can be waived. 
In summary, Mr. Snarr sat upon his hands for 22 months 
prior to filing the Motion to Dismiss. Mr. Snarr's conduct 
in these proceedings after the alleged triggering date in 
1997, is proof positive of the omission of his affirmative 
defenses. Finally, the Rules of Civil Procedure require 
specificity when relying upon a statute or a defense of 
statute of limitations. Although it may be a creative 
eleventh hour effort, it fails to meet the basic 
requirements of notice pleading. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANN. §30-1-4.5 (1987) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID. 
If the Court should forgive the absence and timeliness 
of Respondent's Affirmative Defense, the statute relied upon 
is unconstitutional. The statute in questions states as 
follows: 
§30-1-4.5 (1987) 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to 
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of this chapter; 
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(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship 
described in Subsection (1), or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any 
form, and may be proved under the same general rules of 
evidence as facts in other cases. 
Two Utah Court of Appeals cases regarding the Common Law 
marriage statute, make reference to the questionable 
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5(1987). 
In Rnnnh v. Englehorn, 906 P. 2d 918, fnote 3, (Utah Ct. App., 
1995), and Hansen v. Hansen, 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 28, 
fnote 2, (Utah Ct. App., 1998) the Court of Appeals 
footnoted its concern with open access to courts based upon 
the time restrictions dictated by the statute. 
The Petitioner is unaware of any other statute that 
terminates a remedy after initiating the legal action within 
the prescribed time periods. The only analogous statutes 
are statutes of repose. This is not to be confused with 
statute of limitations. 
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the difference 
between such statutes in Sun Valley Water Beds v. Herm 
Hughes & Son, Inc.r 782 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1989) and Berry 
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ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 
(Utah 1985). As cited in Velarde v. Board of Review of 
Indus, CoTrmi'n.r 831 P.2d 123, (1992) the Court of Appeals 
reiterates the distinctions• 
Although a statute of repose is similar to a statute of 
limitations, the two operate differently. A statute of 
limitations precludes suit a statutorily specified 
number of years after a cause of action accrues. A 
statute of repose, on the other hand, prevents suit a 
statutorily specified number of years after a particular 
event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action 
accrues. Hence, a statute of repose may bar the filing 
of a lawsuit even though the cause of action did not 
arise until after the action was barred and although the 
injured person was diligent in seeking a remedy. 
Although such statutes have passed constitutional muster 
in other states, see Horton Y, GQldminerfs Daughter, 785 
P.2d 1087, 1091 n.3 (Utah 1989), Utah courts have 
interpreted the open courts provision of the Utah 
Constitution to proscribe statutes of repose unless the 
statutes have certain redeeming characteristics, at 125. 
Utah Const, Art. I, § 11, states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which 
he is a party. 
The Utah Supreme Court makes the most thorough analysis 
of the State's Constitutions application to statutes of 
repose in Bfirry v> Rftenhnraft. Id. 
22 
Although we may not apply section 11 "in a 
mechanical fashion to strike every statute with which 
there may be conflict," Berry, 717 P.2d at 680, the 
section imposes serious limits on the legislature's 
power to deny plaintiffs their existing common law 
rights and remedies. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test which 
contemplates both the individual rights constitutionally 
protected by the open courts provision and the legislative 
interest in promoting the social and economic welfare. 
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides 
an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy "by due course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. The benefit 
provided by the substitute must be substantially equal 
in value or other benefit to the remedy abrogated in 
providing essentially comparable substantive protection 
to onefs person, property, or reputation, although the 
form of the substitute remedy may be different. . . . 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of 
action may be justified only if there is a clear social 
or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or 
unreasonable means for achieving the objective Id. at 
680 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case, no specified alternative remedy 
exists. Although §4.5(1) makes a vague reference to an 
*administrative order', nothing is defined regarding the 
agency (state or federal) or procedure that could be 
commenced and completed to escape the one (1) year death 
knell of Subsection 2. 
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Second, no clear social or economic evil can be 
articulated or reasonably achieved by a process uniquely 
defined by the date of completion versus date of 
commencement. The Legislative History is similarly silent 
regarding the purpose of this unique provision. (See 
Addendum, p.35) 
Therefore, this statute is not constitutionally viable. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLEiD TO ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The Appellant requested but was denied attorney's fees 
at the trial court.(R.3,112; R.229,13) Ms. Snarr has 
obviously limited resources and ability to pay in pursuing 
this matter on appeal.(R.70-83) Appellant should prevail on 
the merits and the matter of attorney's fees should be 
remanded with instructions to determine the appropriateness 
of fees for Ms. Snarr pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §30-3-3 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Snarr failed to make a timely motion on the merits 
of his issue. He further failed to preserve the issue in 
any pleadings during the salient period he claims the trial 
court lost jurisdiction. These procedures are void of any 
claim of subject matter jurisdiction before filing a Motion 
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to Dismiss on the day of trial. 
Should the Court believe Mr. Snarr's position entitles a 
review of Utah Code Ann. §30-1-4.5, the statute is 
constitutionally flawed. However the statute is categorized 
(limitations, repose, or in artful), it clearly limits Ms. 
Snarr's right to obtain redress in the Courts as is 
protected by Utah State Constitution, Art. I, Section 11. 
DATED thisj2>2 day of October, 1999. 
^ L . G. CUTLER 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Appellant's Brief, on thisj2jZ day of 
October, 1999, to Stephen W. Cook, Attorney for Respondent, 
at 323 South 600 East, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102. 
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ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS 
AND 
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 
(March 2, 1999) 
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STEPHEN W COOK. USB #0720 
STEPHEN W COOK, P C 
Attorney for Respondent 
323 South 600 East. Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone (801)595-8600 
Telefax (801)595-8614 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY DEE SNARR. 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS 
Petitioner, OBJECTIONS AND ORDER 
DISMISSING A CTON 
vs 
KENNETH GUY SNARR, Civil No 964904304 
Respondent Judge Ana M Stirba 
The Petitioner's Objections To Commissioner's Recommendation came 
regularly before the Court, the Honorable Am M Striba, District Court Judge, 
presiding, on Febmary 11, 1998, at the hour of 9 00 a m The Petitioner was present 
and was represented by her counsel, L G Cutler The Respondent was present and 
was represented by his counsel, Stephen W Cook After having heard the arguments 
of counsel, after having reviewed the Court's file, including the Commissioner's 
Recommendation for correctness, and after having been fully advised in the 
premises, the Court finds and concludes that the material facts are not in dispute, 
finds and concludes that the Petitioner had an opportunity to comply with Utah's 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
common law marriage statute, Section 30-1-4.5 U.C.A. (1953). as amended, but 
failed to do so, finds and concludes that the decision of Bunch v. Englehorn. 906 
P.2d 918 (Ut.Ct.App. 1995) is controlling, finds and concludes that the 
Commissioner's Recommendation is correct as a matter of law. and finds and 
concludes that for the reasons set forth in the Commissioner's recommendations and 
the arguments of Respondent that the Petitioner's Objections To Commissioner's 
Recommendation should be denied. 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Petitioner's Objections To Commissioner's Recommendation are 
hereby denied. 
2. The above-entitled action is hereby dismissed with prejudice 
3. The parties' requests for attorney's fees are denied and each party shall 
assume and pay their own respective court costs and attorney's fees 
DATED this 2^day of O^ i* tl^ , 1999. 
B Y T H E C O U ^ ^ ? ^ 
R JWL-
DISTRICT CWK^W^T^ 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
'SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says. 
That he is the attorney for Respondent herein; and that he served the attached 
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS AND ORDER DISMISSING 
ACTON upon: 
L.G. CUTLER 
Attorney at Law 
5995 South Traditions Lane 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84123 
by placing a taie and conect copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the same, 
sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States mail at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the ^ g ^ day of February, 1999 
jd. <& fUL 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ^ 2 day of February. 1999. 
Notan, P^'IC """ T 
KAREMLKNUTSQN I 
1615 cssi 0s53e Oranoe Avenue I 
Salt Lake Ov Utah84i24 I 
M> Corrnrsion Expires 
Dc ember 30. P0D0 f 
1V> 
DISTRICT COURT RULING 
February 11, 1999 
Tr. 20-2 
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THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CUTLER: - and is silent as to, you know, any 
other reason other that what's contained within the dicta 
and the holding — 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CUTLER: — but I don't see anything in the 
dicta or the holding that says it is subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
MR. CUTLER: So that's my answer. I — 
THE COURT: I see. All right. Thank you, 
Mr. Cutler. 
This case poses some challenge, and I appreciate 
the thoroughness with which counsel has prepared, both 
before the commissioner and here today in oral argument. I 
have not run across a provision like this statute either, 
where there is a duty to see that litigation is completed 
within a certain time period, although certainly litigation 
of this type can be completed within the time period 
prescribed by the legislature. It's not an impossibility. 
But the obligation of making the Court aware of 
the time restrictions is on — clearly has to be on the one 
who's claiming the common-law marriage, because the 
obligations are on that person to comply with the statute, 
and also to show that the elements of a common-law marriage 
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exist. I have considered the arguments, and I'm prepared to 
rule at this time. 
It appears to the Court that the Engelbert 
decision is controlling in this matter, and the Court is 
obliged to follow that law. It appears that the court was 
upholding the decision of Judge Eves based on an assessment 
that the statute was jurisdictional and it can't be made 
into something else, a statute of limitations by the trial 
court in the wake of the appellate decision. 
And in addition, the reasoning of the commissioner 
appears to this Court to be sound in the other respects 
articulated by Commissioner Evans, and the Court finds that 
the commissioner — and the review, of course, of the 
commissioner's recommendation is, well, one of correctness, 
to borrow from the appellate phrase, because it's only a 
recommendation from the commissioner. 
But the material facts do not appear to have been 
in dispute, either before the commissioner or presented here 
today, and it appears to the Court: that the commissioner was 
correct as a matter of law in his analysis. 
Accordingly, for those reasons and rhe others 
articulated by respondent, the objection is respectfully 
overruled. 
I'd like Mr. Cook to prepare an order consistent 
with that ruling, and I thank you folks and gcod luck to 
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MR. COOK: Thank you. 
THE COURT: The court's in recess. 
(Proceedings concluded at 9:30 a.m. 
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PETITIONER'S COMPLAINT 
R.1-4 
October 7, 1996 
30 
7 .-. 
- ,"i 
A* (X, L. G. CUTLER, #0789 tAs^K '•''J 
NTJ* Attorney for Plaintiff ' ^ ^ ^ ^ 
^ US 560 East 200 South, Suite 220 "T-^^'-/>:-V 
^ Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 "X^_ 
^ Telephone: (801) 355-1896 \ 
Facsimile: (801) 521-5468 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY DEE SNARR, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH GUY SNARR, 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Civi] .1 NO. Cft,t90W*3>A 
Judge JJDGE A N N E * * * * 
Plaintiff, Terry Dee Snarr, hereby alleges and states as a 
cause of action against the defendant as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and have been for more than three months 
immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are wife and husband having been 
first married in 1969 later divorced in 1980, however, they 
continued to reside together and held themselves out as husband and 
wife from February, 1980 to the date the separated on approximately 
July 7, 1996. 
3. During the course of the marriage irreconcilable 
differences have arisen between the parties making continuation of 
the marital relationship impossible. 
4. During the course of the marriage, two (2) children have 
been born as issue to this marriage. One child is now deceased and 
the remaining child is emancipated. 
5. The defendant is currently and historically employed in 
two jobs. His primary employment is with Yellow Freight Company 
and has gross monthly income of approximately $3,000. He is also 
self-employed as a car salesman, doing business as Auto Trend 
Motors. The plaintiff has historically assisted the defendant with 
various accounting and clerical functions on a part time basis. 
6. The plaintiff is not currently employed and has not been 
employed for approximately the last five years except her part-time 
assistance with the automobile sales business. 
7. It is reasonable that the defendant be ordered to 
maintain the health and accident insurance currently available 
through his place of employment for the benefit of the plaintiff 
until further order of the Court. It is further reasonable that 
the said insurance policy be made available to the plaintiff at the 
plaintiff's option pursuant the COBRA provisions of the health 
insurance plan. 
8. The plaintiff has a reasonable need for spousal support 
and alimony and the defendant has reasonable income to assist the 
plaintiff. It is reasonable that plaintiff be awarded reasonable 
alimony and spousal support. 
9. The parties have acquired a home and real property during 
the course of the parties marriage located at 4416 Raymond Ct, 
Taylorsville, Utah. It is reasonable that said real property and 
assets be divided between the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner. 
10. The parties have acquired an interest in various items of 
personal property including, but not limited to, an interest in 
Auto Trend furniture, furniture, furnishing, appliances, bank and 
retirement accounts, automobiles and travel trailer, stocks, 
securities, and other assets. It is reasonable that said personal 
property and assets be divided between the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner. 
11. The parties have acquired various debts and obligations 
incurred during the marriage. It is reasonable that said debts and 
obligations should be divided between the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner. 
12. Plaintiff is without sufficient income or resources to 
pay for reasonable attorney's fees and court costs incurred in 
bringing this action. Therefore, the defendant should pay such 
fees and costs. 
13. Each party should be ordered to do whatever is necessary 
to implement the terms of the Decree of Divorce to be entered 
herein, including but not limited to transferring all necessary 
items of property, titles, deeds, documents or any other item 
necessary to comply with the terms of the Decree of Divorce. 
WHEREFORE the plaintiffs prays for the following relief: 
1. A Decree of Divorce should be entered pursuant to the 
terms of plaintiff's complaint; 
2. For the Decree of Divorce to become final upon entry; and 
3. For such further relief as the Court deems proper and 
just. 
DATED this </ day of October, 1996 
L. G. CUTLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff Address: 
4416 Raymond Ct. 
Taylorsville, Utah 84119 
2. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 2 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
3. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 3 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
4. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 4 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
5. The Defendant admits that he has employed by Yellow Freight 
Company, admits that he also is self employed as a car salesman, but denies 
each and eveiy other allegation contained in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
6. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 6 
and further alleges that the Plaintiff is capable of being fully employed. 
7. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 7 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
8. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 8 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
9. The Defendant admits the allegations contained m paragraph 9 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
10. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 10 
STEPHEN W. COOK. USB #0720 
STEPHEN W. COOK. P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
323 South 600 East. Suite 200 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 595-8600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY DEE SNARR. : 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KENNETH GUY SNARR. : Civil No. 964904304 
Defendant. : Judge Ann M. Stirba 
The Defendant, Kenneth Guy Snarr, hereby answers the Plaintiffs Complaint 
as follows: 
The Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a cause of action against the Defendant 
upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
1. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 1 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
11. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 11 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
12. The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 12 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
13. The Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraph 13 
of the Plaintiffs Complaint. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that a Decree of Divorce be 
entered in accordance with terms of his Answer. 
DATED this / / day of February, 1997. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Attorney for Defendant 
$ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
STEPHEN W. COOK, being duly sworn, says: 
That he is the attorney for Defendant herein; and that he served the 
attached ANSWER TO COMPLAINT upon: 
L.G. CUTLER 
560 East 200 South. Suite 220 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102 
by placing a tme and correct copy thereof in an envelope and depositing the 
same, sealed, with first-class postage prepaid thereon, in the United States 
mail at Salt Lake City. Utah, on the / ^ day of February. 1997. 
STEPHEN W. COOK 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ?2~ day of February. 1997. 
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RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
R.5-8 
February 14, 1997 
31 
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED TRANSCRIPT 
Certified Copy 
Proceedings of August 12, 1999 
(R.237) 
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L. G. CUTLER (078 9) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
5995 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone: (801) 261-3407 
Facsimile: (801) 261-3503 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY DEE SNARR, : REQUEST FOR TRANSCRIPT 
Petitioner, : 
vs. : Third District No. 964904304 DA 
KENNETH GUY SNARR, : Appellate Case No. 990285-CA 
Respondent. : 
TO THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT EXECUTIVE: 
Please take notice that the Petitioner, by and through her 
counsel of record, L. G. Cutler, hereby requests a transcript 
be prepared of the a portion of the proceedings held herein. 
More specifically, Petitioner has requested a transcript be 
prepared of the proceedings held on August 12, 1998 before the 
Honorable Ann Stirba, presiding, including those matters heard 
before the Court in chambers. Petitioner shall make full payment 
of the transcript requested and make satisfactory financial 
arrangements in advance. 
Petitioner further requests that you acknowledge receipt of 
this request and to notify the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
of the date on which you expect to file the transcript and of the 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
APR 1 4 1999 
«ALT LAKE COUNTY . 
-^/^ 
date on which you file the transcript. 
A copy of this Request for Transcript is further provided to 
the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and counsel for appellee. 
DATED this / j 7 day of April, 1999, 
L. G. CUTLER 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed by first class 
mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Request of Transcript, on this J3__ day of April, 1999, to 
Stephen W. Cook, Attorney for Respondent, at 323 South 600 East, 
Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
X!>% 
CERTIFIED COPY 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRY DEE SNARR, : 
Petitioner, : Third District No. 964904304 DA 
vs. : Appellate Case No. 990285-CA 
KENNETH GUY SNARR, : 
Respondent. : 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 12th day of August, 
1998, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before 
the HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA, sitting as Judge in the above-
named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the 
following proceedings were had. 
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For the Plaintiff 
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For the Defendant: 
L.G. Cutler 
Attorney at Law 
5995 South Redwood Road 
Salt Lake City, UT 84123 
Stephen W. Cook 
Attorney at Law 
323 South 600 East, #200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
3 
1 II P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the matter of 
3 Snarr vs. Snarr, Case No. 964904304. Court notes the 
4 presence of both parties and their respective counsel, L.G. 
5 Cutler for petitioner, Steven W. Cook for respondent. This 
g is actually the time set for the trial in this matter. 
Before I took the bench this morning at 9:30, counsel 
indicated they wanted to meet with me and I did meet with 
them in chambers. It was off the record. At that time Mr. 
Cook indicated that he had on Monday, this is Wednesday, 
filed a Motion to Dismiss based on a failure to comply with 
the statute 30-1-4.5 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended and 
in that conference he indicated that he was relying on the 
case of Bunch vs. Anglehorn and that's 906 P2nd 918 and that 
the issue being raised is jurisdictional. 
I had not received a copy of the Motion or seen 
the original or was otherwise aware of it. I believe Mr. 
Cutler was aware of the motion and he also indicated he was 
going to be relying on the case of Hansen v. Hansen 342 Utah 
Advanced Reports 25 filed May 7, 1998. I have and Counsel 
graciously supplied me with a copy of each of these cases 
which I have now read. At that time I asked Mr. Cutler if 
he was prepared to argue the motion and he indicated that he 
was. I do not have a memorandum filed in opposition for 
2 4
 I this motion, but I understand that the parties are ready to 
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1 I  argue this motion nonetheless. Is that correct, Counsel, 
2 have I stated everything -- have I summarized everything 
3 that we talked about in chambers and done so accurately? 
4 MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 MR. CUTLER: That is accurate, Your Honor. I would 
g just supplement that obviously this motion be brought at the 
end of my case in chief and I am prepared to argue that. I 
am not waiving the timeliness issue or what other 
information I might have been able to provide you had I had 
an opportunity to provide a memoranda. 
THE COURT: Well, a motion is jurisdictional. A 
jurisdictional claim can be raised at any time. The motion 
is not timely in the sense that it should have been filed 
more than 3 0 days prior to the day of trial and I prepared, 
if you are requesting it, to give you a continuance to file 
a written response to this motion and otherwise prepare 
adequately to respond to it, but if you do not wish to have 
a continuance, then I will deem that as not a valid waiver, 
you know, I believe that you have waived your right to claim 
additional time to respond to it. 
MR. CUTLER: I am not requesting a continuance, 
Your Honor. I was simply, because Mr. Cock claims this is a 
jurisdictional motion we dispute that but we are prepared to 
argue it. 
THE COURT: All right. I will hear argument about 
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1 I! this. It is my understanding that, and I need to be clear 
2 if there is any dispute about when this petition was filed 
3 or anything bearing on the time that various documents were 
4 filed. I have read through the Court file. Also, before 
5 taking the bench. 
MR. CUTLER: I think the three factual items we 
could probably agree to is the parties separated on July 7, 
1996. This action was filed on October --
THE COURT: 7, 1996, I believe. 
MR. CUTLER: -- '96 about three months later. 
There was a request for trial setting filed with the Court 
in January of '97 and there has not been a jurisdictional 
order in regard to this matter or in regard to the statute 
since the filing of the action. 
MR. COOK: I could agree to those so long as we are 
clear that what we are talking about with respect to the 
latter fact is that there has been no administrative order 
or judicial order either during the course of the marriage 
or within one year after the parties separated. 
MR. CUTLER: Correct. We can agree to those facts. 
THE COURT: Very well, then. With that you may 
argue the motion. 
MR. COOK: Your Honor, I'll be very brief in terms 
of my opening (inaudible) and reserve some time to rebuttal 
because I think our motion is very clear on its face. It's a 
6 
1 I  Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12B(1) for lack of subject 
2 matter jurisdiction under the statute Section 30-1-4.5 the 
3 law is clear that in order for common law marriages to be 
4 valid one necessary element is that there be a judicial 
5 determination or administrative order entered during the 
6 period of the marriage or the relationship, I should say, or 
within one year following the termination of that 
relationship which admittedly is not here in this case. 
Those precise facts have went up on appeal to the 
Court of Appeals in a bunch of cases and I submit it to the 
Court and as I read the bunch of cases, the Court indicated 
that that is true. That's what the legislature intended in 
it's purest subject matter jurisdictional in nature and 
dismissed the action. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Cutler? 
MR. CUTLER: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, I 
dispute whether or not it is subject matter jurisdiction. 
It is a remedy that may or may not have been available had 
the parties properly pled it. If I could have the Court 
refer to both the complaint and the answer for a moment and 
specifically defendant's answer. 
Paragraph 2 of the Petitioner, now petitioner's 
complaint is that plaintiff and defendant are wife and 
husband, having been first married in 1969, later divorced 
in 1980. However, they continued to reside together and 
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is not a prayer for dismissal. Their prayer for relief on 
page 3 of the answer is: "Wherefore, defendant prays that a 
decree of divorce be entered in accordance with the terms of 
his answer." That is in essence a request and, again, an 
admission that there is a marriage as previously admitted. 
The other issues that raise prejudice, Your Honor, 
is as outlined in the Hansen case there are several factual 
and legal issues that would have to presented today. 
Whether or not these individuals have a reputation within 
the community as husband and wife, how they refer to 
themselves, and that evidence would have to be brought in by 
third parties or other documents. That we are not prepared 
to bring in that type of those witnesses and that issue has 
never been raised in either of our discovery requests or our 
responses to their discovery requests. 
Finally, Your Honor, if the Court believes that 
there is a jurisdictional question first of all, and second 
of all, that this isn't otherwise waived, then the issue is, 
then there is a constitutional challenge that needs to be 
brought here and that has a double effect upon petitioners. 
First of all, it's a constitutional challenge that 
obviously needs to be argued in detail. That's why I am not 
waiving the memorandum necessary to raise that issue, to try 
and reap a constitutional question or 48 hour notice of what 
you are trying to get prepared for trial I think is 
9 
1 I  descriptive in and of itself. 
2 The second reason is that to challenge a statute 
3 you have to give notice to the Attorney General's office so 
4 they can come in here and defend the statute and we 
5 obviously have not been able to do that or provide the 
6 requisite notice to the Attorney General's office to raise a 
- constitutional challenge. 
THE COURT: Where is that required? 
MR. CUTLER: I believe in the judicial code, Your 
Honor. If you raise a constitutional challenge --
THE COURT: Well, you need to cite me to a 
provision. 
MR. CUTLER: Okay. I will do so, but, again, 
that's the issue of prejudice and the issue of presenting 
all the issues before the Court properly grieved and et 
cetera. This is a constitutional question if the Court gets 
to that point. The constitutional question is firmly raised 
in the footnotes of both cases that the Court has referred 
to. This is an access of Court's issue. If the Court 
believes that these two parties who properly and timely 
filed a divorce, both of them asked this Court for a 
divorce, then three months in separation and they have 
continued to move forward in that course, they requested a 
trial setting for a decree of divorce within seven months, 
excuse me, January, six, seven months of the filing of this 
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1 I  action and we have been waiting for that trial date. 
2 There have been no continuances brought by either 
3 party in this matter and we are talking about an access of 
4 Courts and the Court and the Court of Appeals in both cases 
5 raises that very constitutional issue. So, before we step 
6 through the four hoops to get to that point, I think there 
is many reasons why the Court will say this matter is way, 
it's otherwise not a material issue that has been properly 
pled before the Court is a material issue of fact and law 
that the respondent's have previously admitted to. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. Mr. Cook? 
MR. COOK: I'll address counsel's arguments in the 
same order, Your Honor. 
With respect to the pleadings, there have been 
open pleadings, Mr. Cutler did not set forth all of the 
elements of a common law marriage, for example, whether or 
not they are capable of giving consent, legal, capable of 
entering into a solemnized marriage. He didn't allege that 
they cohabited and that they held themselves out. He failed 
to allege the elements I just mentioned as well as the --
THE COURT: Well, wait just a moment here. Wait 
just a moment. 
MR. COOK: Uh-huh. 
2 3
 THE COURT: Clearly the answer concedes the issue 
2 4
 [J of whether there was a common law marriage. How can your 
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client now after having conceded this point in his answer 
now come back in the same case and claim that there wasn't a 
common law marriage. Why shouldn't your client be stopped 
from raising that challenge. 
MR. COOK: Your Honor, I believe what you are 
referring to is paragraph 2 of the complaint. And as I read 
paragraph 2 he alleged there was a marriage, which we 
concede. There was a marriage. In fact, in 1980. That 
they divorced and they subsequently commenced living 
together. 
THE COURT: No. However, they continued to reside 
together and held themselves out as husband and wife from 
February 198 0 to the day they separated on approximately 
July 7, 1996, held themselves out as husband and wife. 
MR. COOK: That is correct, which is the fourth 
element under Section 30-1-4-5, which I thought that he was 
alleging, which we admit to. We admit that they held 
themselves out as husband and wife. I'll admit they even 
had a joint checking account. Whether or not there was a 
contract entered into between the parties as required by the 
statute is wholly debatable. Whether or not there was any -
THE COURT: All right. The other elements of the 
statute are what? You were going through those before. 
MR. COOK: Number one, that they are capable of 
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1 I giving consent; number two, are legally capable of entering 
2 into a solemnized marriage under the provisions of this 
3 chapter which is the marriage chapter. ® is cohabitating. 
4 (D) mutually assumed marital rights, duties and obligations, 
5 (E), who hold themselves out and then have acquired a 
6 uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. And the 
last is that they make this determination that there be a 
judicial order of termination made within one year of ending 
their marriage. 
So, I admitted everything that he pled. The point 
is, he didn't plead enough. That's why we said it didn't 
set forth an (inaudible) defense, that their case failed to 
(inaudible) --
THE COURT: And where does it say that? 
MR. COOK: That's first affirmative offense. 
THE COURT: All right. And then in your prayer for 
relief your client prays that a decree of divorce be entered 
in accordance with the terms of his answer. That sounds 
like he is recognizing that there is a marriage. 
MR. COOK: Your Honor, I'll be very candid with 
you. This whole area is up in the air. My understanding on 
the practice in this district as well as in other districts 
is that attorneys faced with this one year limitation 
petition the judges to have a hearing on the marriage 
2 4
 relationship within one year, and that's the critical 
ZD 
13 
1 I  question. 
2 At the time we filed that answer there was a case 
3 called Hansen v. Hansen, 1950 -- I have got it here. It's a 
4 very old case. In that particular case the marriage was 
5 determined to be void because one of the parties had failed 
g to get a divorce before they remarried. And the parties 
came into court and tried that case as a divorce case. On 
appeal the Utah Supreme Court said, "Well, if the parties 
consent to issues, then the Court has equitable jurisdiction 
to decide those issues that they consent to have decided." 
In other words, I think that if we came to you and 
said, "We consent to have you look at the property matters 
and have the Court enter a division, an equitable division 
of the property, I would submit they have jurisdiction to do 
that. 
So, when we were framing our answer in this case, 
I had the Hansen case in mind that maybe that's what you 
were going to do is to come in here and litigate the issues 
of property and things of that nature. There is no type of 
consent that there is a valid solemnized marriage or the 
equivalent of a common law statute. 
THE COURT: All right. You may address the other 
issues. 
MR. COOK: With respect to prejudice, Your Honor, I 
think the question there is obviously that Mr. Cutler 
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requires some more time to ask the attorney general to come 
--by the way, I think that's a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure (inaudible) Civil Procedure, but if he wishes to 
do that I think this is an important question that needs to 
be addressed by the Court and it certainly would give him 
whatever time he needs to address that. 
As far as the constitutionality question, of 
course the first proposition is that the Court must presume 
that the statute is constitutional. The burden is on, in 
this case, the petitioner to demonstrate that the statute is 
unconstitutional. Then it must go and address the specific 
provision of whether or not as he's alleged, the open courts 
provision has been violated. In our view, it has not 
because you'd have to put this in the context of what a 
common law marriage is. Context is this: That historically 
this State recognized that there is only one way to have a 
valid marriage and that was to go through what I call a 
traditional marriage. That is, be tested, put in for a 
license, jump through the hoops, have an appropriate person 
to minister the wedding, the proper certificate put on the 
file with the proper authorities, and the State had a 
(inaudible) interest in those procedures because what we are 
talking about ultimately is the legitimization or 
(inaudible) of children, whether or not these parties have 
any rights in terms of alimony which is a unique marital 
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1 I  right and other things such as retirement, it's a State 
2 employee. I mean this is a very broad, wide ranging 
3 question. 
4 The State has an interest in regulating that and 
5 so a nineteen day, seven, I believe it was when the 
6 legislature considered this issue, it decided that, well, if 
7 people would want to allege a common law marriage and escape 
the rules that we have established historically in the State 
for over a hundred years, then they must do it in a very 
precise, mechanical way. And that's why they enacted the 
statute the way that they did. 
And I think the reason they left this one year 
window open is because this question is so important. I 
don't know of any decision in life that's more important 
than marriage and a State has a fundamental right to 
regulate marriages. They have an opportunity to come in 
court within one year. Fact is, the respondent here didn't 
petition to have the matter heard within one year. That 
certainly doesn't violate the open courts provision in our 
judgment. So given the background and why the legislature 
enacted the act in the matter that it did, we feel that the 
constitutional challenges, that's out of the question. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Cutler, maybe I didn't 
understand what you said you were not waiving. Was it is 
that you are not waiving? 
16 
1 II MR. CUTLER: Your Honor, the right to respond by 
2 memorandum, if necessary to address certainly the 
3 constitutional issue which should be (inaudible) if we get 
4 to that point, but I am prepared to argue about this issue 
5 of waiver and whether or not the four corners of the 
g pleadings they stand on their own and my point to the court 
is simply their prayer for relief was giving a decree of 
divorce and now that's changed 48 hours previously without 
any other prior filed. 
THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that this does 
require additional briefing. I am concerned about, actually 
the constitutional issue seems to be addressed, well, it's 
not, yes or no, addressed by the Court of Appeals. It 
indicates at the trial court, the issue is not preserved in 
the trial court and therefore it wasn't specifically 
addressed but in the footnote they indicated that a narrow 
area in which they had constitutional concerns and I don't, 
you know, whether you can infer that there is some other 
constitutional concern they have about the statute as it was 
presented on the facts is open to some question, I suppose. 
But, the other area in which I have some question 
is in the area of judicial estoppel. Whether in this case 
given the prayer for relief and what is alleged, whether the 
respondent: is judicially estopped from denying existence of 
2 4
 I a common law marriage based on the pleadings and I have a 
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1 I  question about that under the facts of this case. So, I 
2 need some additional briefing with regard to these various 
3 aspects of the motion. I'd also note that although a 
4 jurisdictional issue, assuming it is a jurisdictional issue 
5 can be raised at any time/ it is under the Code of Judicial 
g Administration, motions must be filed at least 30 days prior 
- to trial. This was filed two days prior to trial. That 
made all of this argument much more difficult and the issues 
were ripe months ago for the filing of this motion. 
Having said all of that, I am going to take this 
motion under advisement. I may even require that although I 
have considered this motion at this time, I may require that 
this first be submitted to the commissioner as required 
under the Code of Judicial Administration and reargue it 
before the commissioner first and then present it. So, the 
only question now is whether to proceed with the trial or 
whether to continue the trial and the parties are ready to 
proceed to trial, is that correct? 
MR. CUTLER: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there any request for a 
continuance or shall we proceed? Is there a stipulation to 
proceed? 
MR. CUTLER: May I confer with counsel for just a 
moment, Your Honor? 
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1 II THE COURT: Yes . 
2 MR. CUTLER: Your Honor, because we have been 
3 waiting for a moment. Could I impose upon the Court's 
4 patience for just a quick two minute recess so I can speak 
5 to my client? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. CUTLER: This has a major attack on her, 
obviously. 
THE COURT: If you need too. 
(Recess) 
THE COURT: All right. We are on the record in the 
matter of Snarr v. Snarr. The record should reflect the 
Court is in session in chambers. The parties are not 
present. Counsel came in and we've had a brief discussion. 
We're making record of that discussion now. Mr. Cutler came 
in and indicated that he felt that it was appropriate for 
him to be given the time to do a full briefing of the issues 
that were raised by this motion today and therefore, albeit 
reluctantly, is requesting a continuance of the trial and 
reluctantly it appears to me based on the fact that the 
parties were ready for trial, the trial had to be continued 
once before and I presume and infer from all of this that 
they are at least Ms. Snarr is anxious to proceed to the 
trial. The respondent is not objecting to this given that 
it was respondent who filed the motion just two days before 
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the trial. 
2 II Have I summarized this fairly accurate? 
3 MR. CUTLER: That's accurate, Your Honor. 
4 MR. COOK: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: Okay. Accurately? And the issues that 
6 need to be briefed are the constitutionality of the statute 
as applied to the facts in this case and also the issue of 
whether by virtue of the pleadings or other conduct of the 
parties in the record known to counsel there has been a 
concession by respondent that there was a common law 
marriage, not just to an element or even a couple of 
elements, but whether there has been a concession as to 
whether there is a common law marriage. And as to this, I 
would expect this really to take the form, it's more raised 
in the matter of a Motion for Summary -- or at least the 
response today challenges by looking to the pleadings, is 
claiming that reasonable inferences drawn from the answer 
and the complaint when read in conjunction with one another 
and the prayer for relief suggests that there was a 
concession to the issue of whether there was a common law 
marriage and that the respondent was focusing on the terms 
of a divorce decree as opposed to contesting the existence 
of a common law marriage. Is that all clear? So I want 
that fully briefed. 
Then, when that's submitted -- I want you to 
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1 I  submit it for decision so that I am aware of that. Send a 
2 cover letter with it reminding me that it's this case and at 
3 that time I will make a determination as to whether I 
4 consider the motion or refer it to the domestic relations 
5 commissioner for consideration first before it comes back to 
the Court. 
So, based on all of this, and I am reluctant to do 
it too, because I know the parties were prepared to go to 
trial. I certainly was prepared to hear the trial. But the 
issues are of vital importance it seems to be to both 
parties and it involves an attack on the constitutionality 
of the statute. So, given the high stakes involved, the 
length of the relationship that we are talking about here I 
think that this needs full and careful deliberation and this 
process will accommodate that and I don't see a way of 
accommodating that goal without striking the trial and 
proceeding in this fashion. 
So, I would appreciate it if you would explain 
this to your clients and I will strike the trial date and 
not reset another trial date at this time although if the 
motion is not granted I will do everything in my power to 
get the earliest possible trial date for a resolution of 
these issues. Certainly, anything I can do to speed the 
process along in terms of consideration of motion, whether 
it's before me or before a commissioner, I'll do that as 
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1 I  well. I want to get this matter resolved as I'm sure your 
2 clients do and you do too. 
3 Is there anything else we need to discuss? 
4 MR. COOK: Your Honor, in terms of protocol and in 
5 terms of briefing time, what is your thought? 
6 THE COURT: Let me ask you this: In view of the 
7 issues that you know exist, do you wish to amend your motion 
in any way. Right now, it's just (inaudible) Motion to 
Dismiss. 
MR. COOK: I don't know that I am prepared to 
answer that right now, but I would certainly do so by the 
end of the week, let me put it that way. 
THE COURT: If you intend to file an amended motion 
to dismiss, then do so on or before August 14, that's 
Friday. Then you shall have until August 24 to file a 
memorandum in opposition and then five days to file any 
reply memorandum and then submit it for a decision by cover 
letter. 
MR. CUTLER: With cover letter. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. COOK: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. CUTLER: Thanks, Judge. 
(Proceedings concluded) 
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UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 11 
33 
Utah State Constitution 
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open - Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before 
any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
(c) 1953-1998 LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed 
Elsevier Inc. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 3 0 - 1 - 4 . 5 (1987) 
34 
Utah Code Annotated 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to 
this chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or 
administrative order establishes that it arises out of a 
contract between two consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and 
obligations; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage 
under this section must occur during the relationship 
described in Subsection (1), or within one year following 
the termination of that relationship. Evidence of a marria 
recognizable under this section may be manifested in any 
form, and may be proved under the same general rules of 
evidence as facts in other cases. 
History: C. 1953, 30-1-4.5, enacted by L. 1987, ch. 246, 
2. 
(c) 1953-1998 LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed 
Elsevier Inc. 
SUMMARY OF 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
S.B. 156 
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SUMMARY 
S.B.I 56 
RECOGNITION OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGES 
Summary of the Bill 
The bill provides that a marriage that is not formally solemnized is valid if: 
1. It arises out of a contract between two consenting parties. 
2. The parties are capable of giving consent. That isf they are not minors, 
mentally ill, mentally retarded, or otherwise incapacitated. 
3. The parties are legally capable of being married. Utah law prohibits 
incestuous marriages, marriages between persons with certain venereal 
diseases, the marriage of party who is already married and homosexual 
marriages. 
4. The parties have cohabitated. Courts have held that cohabitation is a 
necessary element of a common law marriage. It is evidence that the other 
elements may or do exist. The length or type of cohabitation may vary. 
5. The parties mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations. 
6. The pa/tics hold themselves out as being married and have acquired the 
reputation of being married. 
Under the proposed amendment, all of these elements must be found to exist by a 
court or administrative hearing officer or body, before the common law marriage is 
actually recognized as valid for all purposes. 
Objections to the Dill 
Once a common law marriage has been found to exist by a court or administrative 
order, it is treated as any other marriage for all purposes. 
Polygamy Passage of the bill would not legalize polygamy. The bill requires that 
the two persons must be "legally capable of being married." If a person had solemnized a 
marriage to one person and was living with another person in a polygamous arrangement, 
they would not considered to be married because they are legally unable to do so. If a 
person was married under common law, he would also be incapable of legally entering into 
any other marriage. 
Adoption Utah law states that "any minor child may be adopted by any adult 
person.11 Consent for the adoption must be obtained from both natural parents of the 
child. Currently, the father of a child born out of wedlock may claim rights to the child. 
If a common law marriage were established, his consent to the adoption would be 
necessary unless other statutory exceptions exist. 
Paternity There are other statutes dealing with paternity and the responsiblity of 
parents to support children. This bill would have no impact on current paternity or child 
support laws. Support of children born from a common law marriage is also provided for in 
paternity and child support collection statutes, but those statues would not conflict with 
the common law marrige provisions—there would simply be more alternatives. 
Probate Once a court has established that a common law marriage exists, the 
beneficiary has the same rights to the deceased spouse's estate as would a person in a 
solemnized marriage. 
Cohabitation Requirement 
Cohabitation is generally required as an element of a valid common-law marriage, 
mostly because it is valid evidence, and a basis for showing that two people have initially 
assumed marital rights and duties, and are holding themselves out as being married. 
Short relationships or ,fone night stands" would not fall into this category. There 
must be an open and conscious association as husband and wife. Courts have not 
established a minimum time that two people must live together before a common-law 
marriage is valid. 
What Other States Do 
Idaho, Montana, Kansas, and Iowa, among others, have broad provisions for "common 
law" marriages 
Welfare Savings to the State 
A significant problem in our public assistance system is the "man in the house" 
situation. There are ab^ut 300 AFDC cases where this situation applies. Under federal 
regulations, a person who is residing with but not married to the mother of dependent 
children must only sign an affidavit stating he is not providing support. If this is done,, the 
state cannot count his income in determining eligibility for welfare. 
If these "man in the house" cases were to come under the provisons of this bill, this 
could save the state government about $325,000 and the federal government $900,000 for 
a total savings of $1,225,000. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 6 
Rule 6. Time. 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time 
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of 
any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable 
statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be 
included. The last day of the period so computed shall be 
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of the 
next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is 
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and 
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice 
given thereunder or by order of the court an act is required 
or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the 
court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) 
with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged 
if request therefor is made before the expiration of the 
period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous 
order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the 
specified period permit the act to be done where the failure 
to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not 
extend the time for taking any action under Rules 50(b), 
52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), 60(b) and 73(a) and (g), except 
to the extent and under the conditions stated in them. 
(c) Unaffected by expiration of term. The period of 
time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any 
proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued 
existence or expiration of a term of court. The continued 
existence or expiration of a term of court in no way affects 
the power of a court to do any act or take any proceeding in 
any civil action which has been pending before it. 
(d) For motions - Affidavits. A written motion, other 
than one which may be heard ex parte, and notice of the 
hearing thereof shall be served not later than 5 days before 
the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by these rules, by CJA 4-501, or by order of 
the court. Such an order may for cause shown be made on ex 
parte application. When a motion is supported by affidavit, 
the affidavit shall be served with the motion; and, except 
as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), opposing affidavits may 
be served not later than 1 day before the hearing, unless 
the court permits them to be served at some other time. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a 
party has the right or is required to do some act or take 
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the 
service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice 
or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the prescribed period. 
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(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding 
pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and 
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, 
contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 
injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, 
res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated 
a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, 
the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the 
pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 9 
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Rule 9. Pleading special matters. 
(a) (1) Capacity. It is not necessary to aver the 
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a 
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the 
legal existence of an organized association of persons that 
is made a party. When a party desires to raise an issue as 
to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any 
party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue 
or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by 
specific negative averment, which shall include such 
supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the 
pleader's knowledge, and on such issue the party relying on 
such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall 
establish the same on the trial. 
(2) Designation of unknown defendant. When a party 
does not know the name of an adverse party, he may state 
that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse party 
may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; 
provided, that when the true name of such adverse party is 
ascertained, the pleading or proceeding must be amended 
accordingly. 
(3) Actions to quiet title; description of interest of 
unknown parties. In an action to quiet title wherein any of 
the parties are designated in the caption as "unknown," the 
pleadings may describe such unknown persons as "all other 
persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate or 
interest in, or lien upon the real property described in the 
pleading adverse to the complainant's ownership, or clouding 
his title thereto." 
(b) Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other 
condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
(c) Conditions precedent. In pleading the performance 
or occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to 
aver generally that all conditions precedent have been 
performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or 
occurrence shall be made specifically and with 
particularity, and when so made the party pleading the 
performance or occurrence shall on the trial establish the 
facts showing such performance or occurrence. 
(d) Official document or act. In pleading an official 
document or act it is sufficient to aver that the document 
was issued or the act done in compliance with law. 
(e) Judgment. In pleading a judgment or decision of a 
domestic or foreign court, judicial or quasi-judicial 
tribunal, or of a board or officer, it is sufficient to aver 
the judgment or decision without setting forth matter 
showing jurisdiction to render it. A denial of jurisdiction 
shall be made specifically and with particularity and when 
so made the party pleading the judgment or decision shall 
establish on the trial all controverted jurisdictional 
facts. 
(f) Time and place. For the purpose of testing the 
sufficiency of a pleading, averments of time and place are 
material and shall be considered like all other averments of 
material matter. 
(g) Special damage. When items of special damage are 
claimed, they shall be specifically stated. 
(h) Statute of limitations. In pleading the statute of 
limitations it is not necessary to state the facts showing 
the defense but it may be alleged generally that the cause 
of action is barred by the provisions of the statute relied 
on, referring to or describing such statute specifically and 
definitely by section number, subsection designation, if 
any, or otherwise designating the provision relied upon 
sufficiently clearly to identify it. If such allegation is 
controverted, the party pleading the statute must establish, 
on the trial, the facts showing that the cause of action is 
so barred. 
(i) Private statutes; ordinances. In pleading a 
private statute of this state, or an ordinance of any 
political subdivision thereof, or a right derived from such 
statute or ordinance, it is sufficient to refer to such 
statute or ordinance by its title and the day of its passage 
or by its section number or other designation in any 
official publication of the statutes or ordinances. The 
court shall thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 
(j) Libel and slander. 
(1) Pleading defamatory matter. It is not necessary 
in an action for libel or slander to set forth any intrinsic 
facts showing the application to the plaintiff of the 
defamatory matter out of which the action arose; but it is 
sufficient to state generally that the same was published or 
spoken concerning the plaintiff. If such allegation is 
controverted, the party alleging such defamatory matter must 
establish, on the trial, that it was so published or spoken. 
(2) Pleading defense. In his answer to an action for 
libel or slander, the defendant may allege both the truth of 
the matter charged as defamatory and any mitigating 
circumstances to reduce the amount of damages, and, whether 
he proves the justification or not, he may give in evidence 
the mitigating circumstances. 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses 
and objections which he does not present either by motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense 
of failure to join an indispensable party, and the objection 
of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may also be 
made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, 
and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of 
the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction 
of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. 
The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be 
disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any 
evidence that may have been received. 
CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
RULE 4-501 
Rule 4-501. Motions. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, 
supporting memoranda and documents with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and 
scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district 
courts except proceedings before the court commissioners and 
small claims cases. This rule does not apply to petitions 
for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda. 
(A) M6tion and supporting memoranda. All motions, 
except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied 
by a memorandum of points and authorities appropriate 
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page number to 
relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other 
documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda 
supporting or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages 
in length exclusive of the "statement of material facts" as 
provided in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of the 
court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is 
made to file an over-length memorandum, the application 
shall state the length of the principal memorandum, and if 
the memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the application 
shall include a summary of the memorandum, not to exceed 
five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The 
responding party shall file and serve upon all parties 
within ten days after service of a motion, a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion, and all supporting documentation. 
If the responding party fails to file a memorandum in 
opposition to the motion within ten days after service of 
the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit 
the matter to the court for decision as provided in 
paragraph (1)(d) of this rule. 
(C) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve 
and file a reply memorandum within five days after service 
of the responding party's memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the Clerk to submit the 
matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be 
in the form of a separate written pleading and captioned 
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The notification shall 
contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for 
decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points 
and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment 
shall begin with a section that contains a concise statement 
of material facts as to which movant contends no genuine 
issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of 
the record upon which the movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The 
points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment shall begin with a section that contains a concise 
statement of material facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in 
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to 
those portions of the record upon which the opposing party 
relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered 
sentence or sentences of the movant's facts that are 
disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's 
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to 
the record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of 
summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the 
opposing party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without 
a hearing unless ordered by the Court, or requested by the 
parties as provided in paragraphs (3)(b) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion would 
dispose of the action or any issues in the action on the 
merits with prejudice, either party at the time of filing 
the principal memorandum in support of or in opposition to a 
motion may file a written request for a hearing. 
(C) Such request shall be granted unless the court 
finds that (a) the motion or opposition to the motion is 
frivolous or (b) that the dispositive issue or set of issues 
governing the granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the court 
shall notify the requesting party. When a request for 
hearing is granted, the court shall set the matter for 
hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter shall 
be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter 
for hearing and notify all parties of the date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a 
courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of points and 
authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the 
motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the matter at 
least two working days before the date set for hearing. 
Copies shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and 
indicate the date and time of the hearing. Courtesy copies 
shall not be filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is made at 
the time the parties file their principal memoranda, a 
hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least 
thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date. No 
dispositive motions shall be heard after that date without 
leave of the Court. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice 
and for good cause shown, the court may grant a request for 
an expedited disposition in any case where time is of the 
essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise 
significant legal issues and could be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion 
or at a party's request may direct arguments of any motion 
by telephone conference without court appearance. A verbatim 
record shall be made of all telephone arguments and the 
rulings thereon if requested by counsel. 
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